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The following abstract was prepared by the Federal Constitutional Court and submitted for publication to the CODICES database maintained by the Venice Commission. Abstracts published by the Venice Commission summarise the facts of the case and key legal considerations of the decision. For further information, please consult the CODICES database. | |
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Please cite the abstract as follows: | |
Abstract of the Federal Constitutional Court’s Order of 25 August 2014, 2 BvR 2048/13 [CODICES] | |
Second Chamber of the Second Senate Order of 25 August 2014 2 BvR 2048/13 | |
Headnotes (non-official):
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Summary:I. II. The right against self-incrimination is enshrined in the rule of law and has constitutional status. The accused must be able to freely decide whether and if so, to what degree to participate in the criminal proceedings. As a rule, a plea bargain only meets the requirements of the principle of a fair trial if the accused has been informed about the limitations of the Court’s commitment to the plea bargain prior to its conclusion. This is the only way to ensure that he can decide independently whether to invoke his freedom to refuse to testify, or to commit to a plea bargain. For these reasons, the duty to inform pursuant to § 257c.5 of the Code is not a mere procedural guideline, but a vital constitutional safeguard of the principle of a fair trial and the right against self-incrimination. As a rule, a plea bargain without prior information of the accused violates the accused’s right to a fair trial and his right against self-incrimination. If this information was omitted, an appellate court will usually have to assume that the confession and thus the judgment were based on this violation. Should the appellate court, for once, find no causal link between the lack of information and the confession, it has to make specific findings on this. The challenged decisions do not meet these standards. |