Headnotes (non-official):
1. When the administrative courts assess an application for refugee status that is based on a fear of religious persecution, they must ascertain beyond doubt that pursuing a specific religious practice, which would lead to persecution in the applicant’s country of origin, is of central importance to the applicant’s religious identity. Such a review does not violate the right of self-determination guaranteed to churches or the individual’s freedom of religion, faith and conscience.
2. Yet there are limits to the administrative courts’ power of review:
They must see the church membership as fact and use it as the basis for their review; they can question neither the validity of a baptism nor the way in which religious communities understand themselves. This holds true even if there is evidence that tactical considerations have influenced the decision to convert to a faith. Such evidence, however, can be taken into account when determining the likelihood of persecution.
The administrative courts are also not allowed to conduct a “content-related assessment of faith” (inhaltliche Glaubensprüfung). Above all, administrative bodies and courts cannot use their own ideas to replace the applicant’s or the religious community’s assessment as to the content and meaning of a belief, its place in the religious framework, or the legitimacy of certain beliefs and practices.
3. However, this must be distinguished from the question whether, and if yes, which aspects of a faith or of its practice shape the applicant’s religious identity to such a degree that it warrants a well-founded fear of persecution. Ultimately, the administrative courts must evaluate the applicant’s relationship with their faith. In doing so, the courts must take into account a number of considerations that can shed light on an applicant’s religious identity; these include, for example, their religious background, religious practices they pursued in their country of origin, their motivations for renouncing their previously held faith, their family’s reaction, their level of knowledge of their new faith, its importance for their everyday life, and the way in which they practice their religion. This is also required pursuant to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The fact that an applicant is familiar with the teachings of a faith can indicate that converting was of such importance that their identity is shaped by their belief, but conversely, a lack of familiarity with such teachings cannot in every case lead to the presumption that converting was not of such importance.
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Summary:
I.
The applicant is an Iranian citizen who had put in an application for asylum which was rejected by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees because he could not sufficiently demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. In the course of the ensuing legal proceedings, the applicant added that he was baptised and formally converted to Christianity in the meantime and that he had regularly been attending church events. He argued that he might face religious persecution if he were deported to Iran and asserted that this possibility would have to be taken into account as part of his claim for asylum. The administrative court agreed and held that he must be granted refugee status.
The Higher Administrative Court overturned this decision, finding that the applicant would not face persecution for religious reasons if he returned to Iran. During the hearing, the applicant did not convince the Higher Administrative Court that he had turned to the Christian faith in a way that shaped his religious identity. He could not provide substantiated reasons for why he had chosen Christianity in particular and he did not attend any lessons in preparation for his baptism that could have broadly conveyed some general ideas on which Christianity draws. Even though he did have some basic knowledge, the Higher Administrative Court did not gain the impression that the applicant had gone beyond learning key beliefs or that he had deeply engaged with the faith and internalised it as something that would shape his identity for the rest of his life. Given the social support offered by the church and by the Iranian parish, the Higher Administrative Court considered it likely that the applicant had converted to Christianity mainly for social reasons. The applicant was denied leave to appeal on points of law and his complaint against this was rejected by the Federal Administrative Court.
II.
The Federal Constitutional Court did not admit the constitutional complaint for decision and held that the standards used by the Federal Administrative Court to determine whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution on religious grounds are not objectionable under constitutional law. There is no violation of the applicant’s fundamental right of freedom of religion, faith and conscience under Article 4.1 and 4.2 of the Basic Law, Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 9.1 ECHR. Nonetheless, when applying the standards in question, the right under these provisions and its special importance must be taken into account.
According to the Federal Administrative Court’s case-law, in order to answer the question whether an interference constitutes a sufficiently severe act of persecution within the meaning of the Asylum Act, it must firstly be determined from an objective viewpoint what measures will be taken against an applicant in the respective country of origin if they pursue a specific religious practice and how severe such measures will be. In particular, an act of persecution will be considered sufficiently severe where there is a danger that the applicant’s life, limb or freedom will be harmed, that they will be prosecuted, or that they will face inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if they practice their faith publicly or privately. Not practicing one’s faith due to the threat of persecution can be comparable to persecution itself. Secondly, it must be determined from a subjective viewpoint whether pursuing a specific religious practice identified as likely to trigger persecution is a central element of the applicant’s religious identity and whether it is thereby indispensable to them. In doing so, it must be considered how the applicant incorporates their faith into their life and whether, according to their understanding, practicing their faith in a way that would lead to persecution is necessary to preserve their religious identity.
These considerations form part of the review conducted independently by the trial judge in the administrative courts. Reviewing whether the requirements for granting refugee status under the Asylum Act are satisfied is not a matter for the churches or religious communities. Under EU, European and national law, only the Federal Republic of Germany itself – namely, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the administrative courts – is responsible for determining refugee status.
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